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Մասնակից:Մարի Ավետիսյան/ԱվազարկղԱ

Վիքիպեդիայից՝ ազատ հանրագիտարանից

Էթնիկ զտումներ Բոսնիական պատերազմի ժամանակ

[խմբագրել | խմբագրել կոդը]
A destroyed house in the Višegrad municipality

Ethnic cleansing is a purposeful policy of "rendering an area ethnically homogeneous by using force or intimidation to remove from a given area persons from another ethnic group".[1]

A report by the UN Commission of Experts dated 27 May 1994 defined ethnic cleansing as an act of "rendering an area ethnically homogenous by using force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area", and found that ethnic cleansing has been carried out through "murder, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, extra-judicial executions, rape and sexual assaults, confinement of civilian populations in ghetto areas, forcible removal, displacement and deportation of civilian populations, deliberate military attacks or threats of attacks on civilians and civilian areas, and wanton destruction of property".[2] Such forms of persecution of a group were defined as crimes against humanity and they can also fall within the meaning of the Genocide Convention.[3]

The terms "ethnic cleansing" and "genocide" are not synonymous but academic discourse considers both to exist within a spectrum of assaults on nations or ethnoreligious groups. Ethnic cleansing is similar to the forced deportation or population transfer of a group to change the ethnic composition of a territory whereas genocide is aimed at the destruction of a group.[4] To draw a distinction between the terms, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) delivered a verdict in the Bosnian Genocide Case:

It [i.e. ethnic cleansing] can only be a form of genocide within the meaning of the [Genocide] Convention, if it corresponds to or falls within one of the categories of acts prohibited by Article II of the Convention. Neither the intent, as a matter of policy, to render an area "ethnically homogeneous", nor the operations that may be carried out to implement such policy, can as such be designated as genocide: the intent that characterizes genocide is "to destroy, in whole or in part" a particular group, and deportation or displacement of the members of a group, even if effected by force, is not necessarily equivalent to destruction of that group, nor is such destruction an automatic consequence of the displacement. This is not to say that acts described as 'ethnic cleansing' may never constitute genocide, if they are such as to be characterized as, for example, 'deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part', contrary to Article II, paragraph (c), of the Convention, provided such action is carried out with the necessary specific intent (dolus specialis), that is to say with a view to the destruction of the group, as distinct from its removal from the region. — ICJ.[5]

The United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations published a staff report on the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia in August 1992.[6] On 17 November the same year, United Nations special rapporteur Tadeusz Mazowiecki issued a report titled "Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia" to the United Nations (UN).[7] In the report, the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Herzegovina was singled out and described as a political objective of Serb nationalists who wanted to ensure control of territories with a Serb majority as well as "adjacent territories assimilated to them". Paramilitaries played a major role in ethnic cleansing, according to the report.[8]

On 18 December 1992, the United Nations General Assembly issued resolution 47/147, in which it rejected the "acquisition of territory by force" and condemned "in the strongest possible terms the abhorrent practice of 'ethnic cleansing' ", and recognised "the Serbian leadership in territories under their control in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Yugoslav Army and the political leadership of the Republic of Serbia bear primary responsibility for this reprehensible practice".[9]

On 1 January 1993, Helsinki Watch released a report on the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. It found ethnic cleansing was "the most egregious violations in both Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina" because it envisaged "summary execution, disappearance, arbitrary detention, deportation and forcible displacement of hundreds of thousands of people on the basis of their religion or nationality".[10]

United Nations Security Council Resolution 780 authorised the establishment of a Commission of Experts to record the crimes in the former Yugoslavia, including Bosnia and Herzegovina. On 27 May 1994, these reports, which described the policy of ethnic cleansing, were concluded.[11] The United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations held a hearing on war crimes in the Balkans on 9 August 1995.[12]

On 15 November 1999, the UN released its "Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/35: The fall of Srebrenica [A/54/549]", which details the fall of Srebrenica in July 1995 and found it was part of the larger Serb ethnic cleansing plan to depopulate Bosnian territories they wanted to annex so Serbs could repopulate them.[13]

The methods used during the Bosnian ethnic cleansing campaigns included "killing of civilians, rape, torture, destruction of civilian, public, and cultural property, looting and pillaging, and the forcible relocation of civilian populations".[14] They also included administrative measures, such as one ethnic group losing their jobs, experiencing discrimination or denial of hospital treatment.[15] The forcible displacement of civilian populations was a consequence of the conflict and its objective through the ethnic cleansing campaign.[16] The Serb campaign included selective murder of civic, religious and intellectual representatives of Bosniaks and Croats; the sending of adult men into concentration camps and the rape of women. The Serb campaign also included the destruction and burning of Croat and Bosniak historical, religious and cultural sites.[17]

Between 700,000 and a 1,000,000 Bosniaks were expelled from their homes from the Bosnian territory held by the Serb forces.[18] Another source estimates that at least 750,000 Bosniaks and a smaller number of Croats were expulsed from these areas.[19] Additionally, around 30,000 Romani were also ousted.[20] Methods used to achieve this included coercion and terror in order to pressure Bosniaks, Croats and others into leaving Serb-claimed areas.[21]

Detainees in the Manjača camp, near Banja Luka, 1992

The initial Constitution of Republika Srpska in Article I.1 declared that it was "the state of the Serb people", without any mention of other ethnic groups living there.[22] Numerous discriminatory measures were introduced against Bosniaks on VRS-held territory.[23] In the town of Prijedor, starting from 30 April 1992, non-Serbs were dismissed from their jobs and banned from entering the court building, and were replaced by Serbs. Bosniak intellectuals and others were deported to the Omarska camp.[24] Bosniak and Croat homes were searched for weapons and were sometimes looted.[25] On 31 May 1992, an order stipulated that non-Serbs have to mark their houses with white flags or sheets, or to wear white armbands outside their homes.[26] Serb forces accompanied non-Serbs wearing white armbands to buses that transported them to camps at Omarska, Trnopolje and Keraterm camp. Movement was restricted through a curfew and checkpoints. Radio broadcasts appealed to Serbs to "lynch" Bosniaks and Croats.[27] Torture and mistreatment in these detention centres were established as to leave inmates with no other choice then to accept the offer of their release under the condition they sign a document that compelled them to leave the area.[28]

In Banja Luka, Bosniaks and Croats were evicted from their homes, and incoming displaced Serbs took their accommodation. Forced labour imposed by the authorities hastened the flight of non-Serbs. Those leaving Banja Luka had to sign documents of abandonment of their properties without compensation.[29] Paramilitaries frequently broke into the homes of non-Serbs at night to rob and assault the occupants. In some instances, paramilitaries would shoot at the houses. The local Serb police did not prevent these sustained assaults.[30] In Zvornik, Bosniaks were given official stamps on identity cards for a change of domicile; to leave the area, they were forced to transfer their properties to an agency for the exchange of houses. Starting from May–June 1992, Bosniaks were taken by bus to Tuzla and Subotica in Serbia. Some residents were ordered to leave at gunpoint. Similar forced removals occurred in Foča, Vlasenica, Brčko, Bosanski Šamac, and other Bosnian towns.[29] In the villages around Vlasenica, the Serb Special Police Platoon was ordered by Miroslav Kraljević that the territory has to be "100 % clean" and that no Bosniak should remain.[31] UNHCR representatives were reluctant to help Bosniaks leave war-affected areas, fearing they would become unwilling accomplices to the ethnic cleansing.[32] Foča was renamed Srbinje (The Place of the Serbs). One Bosniak woman, who was raped, said her rapist told her his aim was to baptise and convert all of them to Serbs.[33]

In Kozluk in June 1992, Bosniaks were rounded up and placed in trucks and trains to remove them from the area.[34] In Bijeljina, non-Serbs were also evicted from their homes and dismissed from their jobs.[35] Arrested non-Serbs were sent to the Batković camp,[36] where they performed forced labor on the front lines.[37] Serb paramilitary singled out Bosniaks and used violence against them. In the Višegrad massacres of 1992, hundreds of Bosniaks were rounded up on a bridge, shot and thrown into the river or locked in houses and burnt alive; Bosniak women were raped and a Bosniak man was tied to a car and dragged around the town.[38] 70% of all expulsions occurred between April and August 1992, when the Serb forces attacked 37 municipalities across Bosnia, reducing the non-Serb population from 726,960 (54%) in 1991 to 235,015 (36%) in 1997. 850 Bosniak and Croat villages were razed to the ground.[20]

The VRS placed Bosniak enclaves under siege.[39] After the VRS takeover of Srebrenica on 11 July 1995, 7,475 Bosniaks were massacred[40] while a further 23,000 people were bused out of the area by 13 July.[41] Overall, the Serb forces killed approximately 50,000 non-Serbs across Bosnia in order to force many others into leaving.[42]

UN Peace keepers collecting bodies from Ahmići in April 1993

In early 1992, as VRS forces were advancing towards Odžak and Bosanska Posavina, Croat forces routed Serb civilians living in the area and transported them to Croatia. They also expelled Serbs from Herzegovina and burned their houses in May 1992.[43] In 1993, the Bosnian Croat authorities used ethnic cleansing in conjunction with the attack on Mostar, where Bosniaks were placed in Croat-run detention camps. Croat forces evicted Bosniaks from the western part of Mostar and from other towns and villages, including Stolac and Čapljina.[44] To assume power in communities in Central Bosnia and Western Herzegovina that were coveted by the HR BH, its president Mate Boban ordered the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) to start persecuting Bosniaks living in these territories. Croat forces used "artillery, eviction, violence, rape, robbery and extortion" to expel or kill the Bosniak population, some of whom were detained in the Heliodrom and Dretelj camps. The Ahmići and Stupni Do massacres had the aim of removing Bosniaks from these areas.[45]

Croat soldiers blew up Bosniak businesses and shops in some towns. They arrested thousands of Bosniak civilians and tried to remove them from Herzegovina by deporting them to third countries.[46] HR HB forces purged Serbs and Bosniaks from government offices and the police. The Bosniaks of HR HB-designated areas were increasingly harassed.[47] In Vitez and Zenica in April 1993, Croat soldiers warned Bosniaks they would be killed in three hours unless they left their homes.[48] 5,000 Bosniaks were expelled from the Vitez region[49] and 20,000–25,000 from the Croat-controlled part of Mostar.[50] Similar events occurred in Prozor, where Bosniaks left after Croat forces took over the city, looting and burning Bosniak shops.[51] In October 1995, Croatian forces led by Damir Krstičević massacred up to 480 Serb civilians and soldiers in Mrkonjić Grad, while also burning numerous villages around the municipalities of Mrkonjić Grad, Šipovo, Bosansko Grahovo, and Drvar as a part of Operation Southern Move.[52] The mass grave was recovered in April 1996 by Serbian forensics.[53][54]

According to the UN Security Council's "Final Report (1994)", Bosniaks engaged in "grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law" but they did not engage in "systematic ethnic cleansing".[55] Bosnian prosecutors charged former members of the Bosnian Army with crimes against humanity against Serbs, with the aim of expelling them from Konjic and surrounding villages in May 1992.[56][57] During the 1993 siege of Goražde, Bosniak forces expelled some Serbs from the town and placed others under house arrest.[58] Similar incidents occurred in March 1993 when Bosniak authorities initiated a campaign to expel Croats from Konjic. Thousands of Croat civilians were also expelled from Bugojno in 1993 and 1994 by the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.[59][44] During the siege of Sarajevo, Bosniak paramilitary leader Mušan Topalović and his forces abducted and killed mostly Serbs living in and around the Sarajevo suburb Bistrik before Bosnian police killed Topalović in October 1993.[60] After the war, Croats left Vareš, fearing Bosniak revenge. The departure of Croats from Sarajevo, Tuzla and Zenica had different motives, which were not always the direct consequence of pressure by Bosniaks.[21]

Displaced Bosnians in 1993

According to the 1991 census, Bosnia and Herzegovina had a population of 4,364,574, of whom 43.7% were Bosniaks, 31.4% were Serbs, 17.3% were Croats and 5.5% were Yugoslavs.[61] In 1981, around 16% of the population were of mixed ancestry.[62] Serbs constituted 31% of Bosnia and Herzegovina's populace but Karadžić claimed 70% of the country's territory.[63] The organizers of the ethnic cleansing campaign wanted to replace Bosnia's multiethnic society with a society based on Serb nationalist supremacy,[64] which was seen as a form of Serbianisation of these areas.[65] Indian academic Radha Kumar described such territorial separation of groups based on their nationality as "ethnic apartheid".[66]

It is estimated between 1.0[67] and 1.3 million[68] people were uprooted and that tens of thousands were killed during the ethnic cleansing.[69] Serb forces perpetrated most of the ethnic cleansing campaigns and the majority of the victims were Bosniaks.[70][71]

Percentual change of the number of ethnic Bosniaks by Municipality from 1991 to 2013

In September 1994, UNHCR representatives estimated around 80,000 non-Serbs out of 837,000 who initially lived on the Serb-controlled territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina before the war remained there; an estimated removal of 90% of the Bosniak and Croat inhabitants of Serb-coveted territory, almost all of whom were deliberately forced out of their homes.[72] By the end of the war in late 1995, the Bosnian Serb forces had expelled or killed 95% of all non-Serbs living in the territory they annexed.[73] In one municipality, Zvornik, the Bosniak and Croat population dropped from 31,000 in 1991 to less than 1,000 in 1997.[20]

Bosnian professor Murat Prašo analysed the demographic changes of the region from 1991 and 1995, and found that prior to the war, the Bosnian territory held by the Army of the Republika Srpska was 47% Serbs, 33% Bosniaks and 13% Croats. After the war, according to his research, in 1995 Serbs composed 89%, while Bosniaks made 3% and Croats 1% of the remaining population.[74] In the Bosnian territory held by the HVO and the Croatian Army, before the war, Croats composed 49% of the population; this percentage rose to 96% in 1996. By the same year, the percentage of Bosniaks fell from 22% to 2.5% and the percentage of Serbs fell from 25% to 0.3%. Before the war, Bosniaks composed 57% of the populace of territory controlled by the Bosnian government; at the end of the war, they composed 74%.[74]

1991–1995 demographic changes, based on the pre-Dayton Agreement territorial control, according to Murat Prašo[75]
Territory held by the Army of Republika Srpska
Ethnic group 1991 1995 Change
Bosniaks 551,000 (32.7%)28,000 (3.1%)-523,000 (-29.6%)
Croats 209,000 (12.4%)11,000 (1.2%)-198,000 (-11.2%)
Serbs 799,000 (47.5%)806,000 (89.2%)+7,000 (+41.7%)
Total 1,683,000 (100%)904,000 (100%)-779,000
Bosnian-government held territory
Ethnic group 1991 1995 Change
Bosniaks 1,235,000 (56.9%)1,238,000 (74.1%)+3,000 (+17.2%)
Croats 295,000 (13.6%)150,000 (9.0%)-145,000 (-4.6%)
Serbs 438,000 (20.2%)180,000 (10.8%)-258,000 (-9.4%)
Total 2,170,000 (100%)1,671,000 (100%)-499,000
Territory held by the Croatian Defence Council and the Croatian Army
Ethnic group 1991 1995 Change
Bosniaks 117,000 (22.1%)8,000 (2.5%)-109,000 (-19.6%)
Croats 259,000 (49.0%)307,000 (95.6%)+48,000 (+46.6%)
Serbs 130,000 (24.6%)1,000 (0.3%)-129,000 (-24.3%)
Total 529,000 (100%)321,000 (100%)-208,000

Croatian historian Saša Mrduljaš analysed the demographic changes based on the territorial control following the Dayton Agreement. According to his research, in Republika Srpska, the number of Bosniaks changed from 473,000 in 1991 to 100,000 in 2011, the number of Croats from 151,000 to 15,000, and the number of Serbs changed from 886,000 to 1,220,000.[76] In the territory controlled by the ARBiH, the number of Serbs changed from 400,000 to 50,000, the number of Croats changed from 243,000 to 110,000, and the number of Bosniaks changed from 1,323,000 to 1,550,000.[77] In the HVO-held area, the number of Serbs changed from 80,000 to 20,000, the number of Bosniaks changed from 107,000 to 70,000, and the number of Croats changed 367,000 in 1991 to 370,000 in 2011.[77]

1991–2011 demographic changes, based on the 1995/1996 territorial control, according to Saša Mrduljaš[78]
Territory held by the Army of Republika Srpska
Ethnic group
1991 2011 Change in share
Bosniaks473,000 (28.9%) 100,000 (7.4%) –21.6%
Croats151,000 (9.2%) 15,000 (1.1%) –8.1%
Serbs886,000 (54.2%) 1,220,000 (90.0%) +35.8%
Yugoslavs[Ն 1]82,000 (5.0%) -–5.0%
Others42,000 (2.6%) 25,000 (1.5%) –1,1%
Total1,634,000 1,957,000
Territory held by the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Ethnic group
1991 2011 Change in share
Bosniaks1,323,000 (61.3%) 1,943,000 (89.1%) +27.8%
Croats243,000 (11.3%) 180,000 (6.3%) –4.9%
Serbs400,000 (18.5%) 55,000 (2.9%) –15.6%
Yugoslavs[Ն 1]140,000 (6.5%) -–6.5%
Others54,000 (2.5%) 35,000 (1.7%) –0.8%
Total2,160,000 1,745,000
Territory held by the Croatian Defence Council
Ethnic group
1991 2011 Change in share
Bosniaks107,000 (18.3%) 75,000 (14.9%) –3.4%
Croats367,000 (62.8%) 370,000 (78.7%) +15.9%
Serbs80,000 (13.7%) 20,000 (4.3%) –9.4%
Yugoslavs[Ն 1]21,000 (3.6%) -–3.6%
Others9,000 (1.5%) 10,000 (2.1%) +0.6%
Total584,000 500,000

Initial estimates placed the number of refugees and internally displaced people during the Bosnian War at 2.7 million,[81] though later publications by the UN cite 2.2 million people who fled or were forced from their homes.[82] It was the largest exodus in Europe since World War II.[32] A million people were internally displaced and 1.2 million people left the country;[83] 685,000 fled to western Europe—330,000 of whom went to Germany—and 446,500 went to other former Yugoslav republics.[84] The Bosnian War ended when the Dayton Agreement was signed on 14 December 1995; it stipulated Bosnia and Herzegovina was to stay a united country shared by Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and Republika Srpska, and granted the right of return for victims of ethnic cleansing.[85]

Number of refugees or internally displaced in 1992–1995
Country Bosniaks Croats Serbs
Bosnia and Herzegovina1,270,000
(63% of the group)[86]
490,000
(67% of the group)[86]
540,000
(39% of the group)[86]

The homogenization of the population continued after the war finished.[87] When the Serb-held areas of Sarajevo were transferred to the FBiH in March 1996,[87] many Serbs left Sarajevo in the ensuing months.[88] Between 60,000[89] and 90,000[90] Serbs left Sarajevo's suburbs. This was interpreted as a result of Dayton's division of Bosnia along ethnic lines.[90] The Bosnian Serbs' politicians pressured Serbs into leaving Sarajevo while the mixed statements of the Bosnian government caused a lack of confidence among Serb inhabitants.[90] Bosnian Serb extremists burned apartments and expelled Serbs who wanted to stay in these suburbs before the handover to the Bosnian government. In Ilidža, medicine, machines and utility equipment disappeared. Serb politician Momčilo Krajišnik publicly called for Serbs to leave Sarajevo, which prompted a UN press officer to call the Serb authorities "the masters of manipulation".[89] This episode is often cited as "difficult to distinguish between coercion and voluntarism".[21]

The demographic changes caused by the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina were the most dramatic that country had experienced in a century; the 2013 population census registered 3,531,159 inhabitants—a more-than-19% decline within a single generation.[91]

Կրոնական շենքերի ոչնչացում

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Ուղղափառ կրոնական շենքերի ոչնչացում (1992–1995)[92]
Ոչնչացված եկեղեցիներ Վնասված եկեղեցիներ Ոչնչացված եկեղեցական շինություններ Վնասված եկեղեցական շինություններ
Բանյա Լուկայի եպարքոսություն 2 3 Տվյալներ չկան Տվյալներ չկան
Բիհաչկո-Պետրովացի թեմ 26 68 Տվյալներ չկան Տվյալներ չկան
Դաբրոբոսանսկայի թեմ 23 13 Տվյալներ չկան Տվյալներ չկան
Զահումսկո-հերցեգովացկայի թեմ 36 28 Տվյալներ չկան Տվյալներ չկան
Զվորնիկ-տուզլանսկայի թեմ 38 60 Տվյալներ չկան Տվյալներ չկան
Ընդհանուր 125 172 67 64

In 1998, Bosnian bishops reported 269 Catholic churches had been destroyed in the Bosnian War.[93]

Total number of destroyed Catholic religious objects in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992–1995)[94]
Destroyed by Muslims Destroyed by Serbs Damaged by Muslims Damaged by Serbs Total destroyed during the war Total damaged during the war Total
churches 8 117 67 120 125 187 312
chapels 19 44 75 89 63 164 227
clergy houses 9 56 40 121 65 161 226
monasteries 0 8 7 15 8 22 30
cemeteries 8 0 61 95 8 156 164
Total 44 225 250 481 269 731 1000

Destruction of housing units

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Around 500,000 of the 1,295,000 housing units in Bosnia were either damaged or destroyed; 50% were damaged and 6% destroyed in FBiH while 24% were damaged and 5% destroyed in RS.[95] Some of the destruction was incidental damage from combat but most of the extensive destruction and plunder was part of a deliberate plan of ethnic cleansing that was aimed at preventing expelled people from returning to their homes.[96] Half of the schools and a third of the hospitals in the country were also damaged or destroyed.[97]

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Radovan Karadžić, the president of Republika Srpska, was sentenced for genocide in Bosnia by the ICTY in 2016

Several people were tried and convicted by the UN-backed International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in connection with persecution on racial, religious or ethnic grounds,[Ն 2] forced displacement and deportation as a crime against humanity during the Bosnian War. The Srebrenica massacre, which was also included as part of the ethnic cleansing campaign,[99][13] was found to constitute a crime of genocide.[100]

Those convicted for taking part in the ethnic cleansing campaigns in Bosnia and Herzegovina include Bosnian Serb politicians, soldiers and officials Momčilo Krajišnik,[101] Radoslav Brđanin,[102] Stojan Župljanin, Mićo Stanišić,[103] Biljana Plavšić,[104] Goran Jelisić,[105] Miroslav Deronjić,[106] Zoran Žigić,[107] Blagoje Simić,[108] Jovica Stanišić, Franko Simatović,[109] Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić.[110] They also include Bosnian Croat officials Mladen Naletilić,[111] Dario Kordić,[112] Slobodan Praljak, Bruno Stojić and Jadranko Prlić.[113]

In its verdict against Karadžić, the ICTY found there was a joint criminal enterprise that aimed to forcibly resettle non-Serbs from large parts of Bosnia, and that it existed from October 1991:

... the Chamber finds that together with the Accused, Krajišnik, Koljević, and Plavšić shared the intent to effect the common plan to permanently remove Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from Bosnian Serb claimed territory, and through their positions in the Bosnian Serb leadership and involvement throughout the Municipalities, they contributed to the execution of the common plan from October 1991 until at least 30 November 1995.[114]

In the judgement against Bosnian Croat leader Dario Kordić, the ICTY found there was a plan to remove Bosniaks from Croat-claimed territory:

... the Trial Chamber draws the inference from this evidence (and the evidence of other HVO attacks in April 1993) that there was by this time a common design or plan conceived and executed by the Bosnian Croat leadership to ethnically cleanse the Lašva Valley of Muslims. Dario Kordić, as the local political leader, was part of this design or plan, his principal role being that of planner and instigator of it.[115]
  1. ANNEX IV: Policy of Ethnic Cleansing: Summary and Conclusions I. Introduction, 27 May 1994
  2. «Annex - Final Report Of The Commission Of Experts Established Pursuant To Security Council Resolution 780» (PDF). icty.org (անգլերեն). UN Security Council. 27 May 1994. էջ 33. Վերցված է 7 July 2020-ին.
  3. Bartrop, 2019, էջեր 26–27
  4. Schabas, 2000, էջ 199-200
  5. International Court of Justice, 2007, էջեր 83–84
  6. The Ethnic Cleansing of Bosnia — A Staff Report. S. PRT. ;102-103. Washington, D.C.: United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. August 1992. ISBN 9780160391101. Վերցված է 2 June 2020-ին.
  7. «UN Commission on Human Rights - Situation of human rights in former Yugoslavia (Mar 96)». hrlibrary.umn.edu. Վերցված է 2024-06-10-ին.
  8. Mazowiecki, 17 November 1992, pp. 6–7
  9. «A/RES/47/147 Situation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia». United Nations. 18 December 1992. Արխիվացված է օրիգինալից 13 February 2002-ին. Վերցված է 25 July 2019-ին.
  10. «Human Rights Watch World Report 1993 - The former Yugoslav Republics». Helsinki Watch. 1 January 1993. Վերցված է 10 July 2017-ին.
  11. ANNEX IV: Policy of Ethnic Cleansing, 27 May 1994
  12. «War Crimes in the Balkans—Joint Hearing» (PDF). United States Senate. Washington, D.C. 9 August 1995. Վերցված է 2 June 2020-ին.
  13. 1 2 Report A/54/549, 15 November 1999, p. 106
  14. ANNEX IV: Policy of Ethnic Cleansing: Ethnic Cleansing in BiH - I: Introduction, 27 May 1994, p. 33
  15. Calic, 2013, էջ 134
  16. Young, 2001, էջ 782
  17. Lawson, 2006, էջ 23
  18. Burg, Shoup, էջ 171
  19. Thompson, 2014, էջ 465
  20. 1 2 3 Calic, 2013, էջ 126
  21. 1 2 3 Burg, Shoup, էջ 172
  22. Calic, 2013, էջ 131
  23. Clark, 2014, էջ 123
  24. Prosecutor v. Karadžić – Judgement, 24 March 2016, pp. 651–652
  25. Prosecutor v. Karadžić – Judgement, 24 March 2016, p. 654
  26. Nidžara Ahmetašević (4 November 2015). «Bosnia's Unending War». The New Yorker. Վերցված է 4 July 2021-ին.
  27. Prosecutor v. Karadžić – Judgement, 24 March 2016, pp. 656–657
  28. Amnesty International, 1992, էջ 72
  29. 1 2 International Court of Justice, 2007, էջեր 141–142
  30. «War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina: U.N. Cease-Fire Won't Help Banja Luka». Human Rights Watch. June 1994. Վերցված է 25 July 2019-ին.
  31. Prosecutor v. Karadžić – Judgement, 24 March 2016, p. 458
  32. 1 2 Maass, Peter (25 July 1992). «Muslims Forced to Leave Bosnia». The Washington Post. Վերցված է 8 May 2020-ին.
  33. Tozer, Louis (2016). «The Significance of the Role of Religion in the Bosnian Conflict of the 1990s: The Town of Foča as a Case Study». University College London. էջեր 83–84.
  34. Amnesty International, 1992, էջ 75
  35. Prosecutor v. Karadžić – Judgement, 24 March 2016, p. 240
  36. Nizich, 1992, էջ 211
  37. Prosecutor v. Karadžić – Judgement, 24 March 2016, p. 253
  38. Fabijančić, 2010, էջ 88
  39. de Graaff, Wiebes, էջ 186
  40. Brunborg, Lyngstad, էջ 229
  41. Bartrop, Jacobs, էջ 186
  42. Combs, 2007, էջ 73
  43. Burg, Shoup, էջ 229
  44. 1 2 Burg, Shoup, էջ 180
  45. Bartrop, 2016, էջ 25
  46. Pomfret, John (18 May 1993). «Croats Seek 'Intolerable' Deportation of Muslims». The Washington Post. Վերցված է 7 May 2020-ին.
  47. Bartrop, 2016, էջ 24
  48. Burns, John F. (21 April 1993). «Vicious 'Ethnic Cleansing' Infects Croat-Muslim Villages in Bosnia». The New York Times. Վերցված է 8 May 2020-ին.
  49. Mojzes, 2011, էջ 174
  50. Petrovic, 2012, էջ 74
  51. Burns, John F. (30 October 1992). «In a 'Cleansed' Bosnian Town, Croats, Not Serbs, Aim Guns». The New York Times. Վերցված է 8 May 2020-ին.
  52. Dalmacija, Slobodna. «Mrkonjić Grad će tužiti Republiku Hrvatsku > Slobodna Dalmacija > Crna kronika». www.slobodnadalmacija.hr (խորվաթերեն). Արխիվացված է օրիգինալից 2014-09-04-ին. Վերցված է 2025-07-08-ին.
  53. «Serbs unearth 181 bodies in mass grave». The Independent (անգլերեն). 1996-04-05. Վերցված է 2025-07-08-ին.
  54. «Exhumation of Serb bodies completed - UPI Archives». UPI (անգլերեն). Վերցված է 2025-07-08-ին.
  55. ANNEX IV: Policy of Ethnic Cleansing - Part Two: Ethnic Cleansing in BiH - I: Introduction, 27 May 1994, pp. 36–37
  56. Grebo, Lamija (4 December 2017). «Bosnia Arrests 13 Suspected of Crimes in Konjic». BalkanInsight.
  57. Muslimovic, Admir (8 May 2019). «Bosnia Tries Ex-Fighters for Crimes Against Humanity in Konjic». BalkanInsight.
  58. «World Report 1995 - Bosnia-Hercegovina». Human Rights Watch. 1995. Վերցված է 24 May 2020-ին.
  59. Evangelista, Matthew; Tannenwald, Nina (2017). Do the Geneva Conventions Matter?. Oxford University Press. էջ 222. ISBN 978-0-19937-979-8.
  60. Hedges, Chris (12 November 1997). «Postscript to Sarajevo's Anguish: Muslim Killings of Serbs Detailed». The New York Times.
  61. Rogel, 1998, էջ 29
  62. Takeyh, Gvosdev, էջ 84
  63. Nizich, 1992, էջ 32
  64. Donia, Fine, էջ 1
  65. Rieff, 1996, էջ 96
  66. Kumar, 1999, էջ 100
  67. Totten, 2017, էջ 21
  68. Phillips, 2005, էջ 5
  69. Seybolt, 2007, էջ 177
  70. Wheeler, 2002, էջ 149
  71. Tuathail & O'Loughlin 2009, p. 1045
    The majority of the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina was perpetrated by armed formations affiliated with the wartime goals of the SDS and VRS.
  72. Tony Barber; Andrew Marshall (21 September 1994). «Serbs expelled almost 800,000 Muslims». The Independent. London. Վերցված է 27 May 2020-ին.
  73. Riedlmayer, 2002, էջ 115
  74. 1 2 Bringa, 2005, էջ 188
  75. Eberhardt, Owsinski, էջեր 407–408
  76. Mrduljaš, 2011, էջ 532
  77. 1 2 Mrduljaš, 2011, էջ 530
  78. Mrduljaš, 2011, էջեր 530, 532
  79. Dejan Stjepanović (2013). «Territoriality and Citizenship». European Commission CITSEE. Արխիվացված է օրիգինալից 27 March 2022-ին. Վերցված է 6 June 2020-ին.
  80. Vermeulen, Govers, էջ 38
  81. Erlanger, Steven (10 June 1996). «The Dayton Accords: A Status Report». The New York Times.
  82. «UN refugee agency to help Bosnia and Herzegovina set up asylum system». UN News. 11 February 2004. Արխիվացված է օրիգինալից 29 January 2021-ին. Վերցված է 2 April 2020-ին.
  83. Cousens, Cater, էջ 71
  84. Cousens, Cater, էջեր 72–73
  85. Edward Morgan-Jones; Neophytos Loizides; Djordje Stefanovic (14 December 2015). «20 years later, this is what Bosnians think about the Dayton peace accords». The Washington Post. Վերցված է 9 April 2020-ին.
  86. 1 2 3 Friedman, 2013, էջ 78
  87. 1 2 Bieber, 2005, էջ 30
  88. McEvoy, O'Leary, էջ 345
  89. 1 2 Hodge, 2019, էջ 88
  90. 1 2 3 Bieber, 2005, էջ 31
  91. Schwai, Burazor, էջ 355
  92. Mileusnić, Slobodan (1997). «Spiritual Genocide: A survey of destroyed, damaged and desecrated churches, monasteries and other church buildings during the war 1991-1995». Belgrade.
  93. Perica, 2002, էջ 248
  94. Ilija Živković: Raspeta crkva u Bosni i Hercegovini: uništavanje katoličkih sakralnih objekata u Bosni i Hercegovini (1991.-1996.), 1997, p. 357
  95. Kondylis, 2008, էջ 235
  96. Toal, Tuathail, էջ 138
  97. Ringdal, Ringdal, էջ 75
  98. Prosecutor v. Karadžić – Judgement, 24 March 2016, p. 190
  99. «On 10th anniversary of Srebrenica massacre, UN recommits to rehabilitation». UN News. 5 July 2005. Վերցված է 12 April 2020-ին.
  100. «Srebrenica massacre was genocide, UN tribunal for former Yugoslavia confirms». UN News. 14 April 2004. Վերցված է 7 January 2019-ին.
  101. «UN tribunal transfers former Bosnian Serb leader to UK prison». UN News. 8 September 2009. Վերցված է 15 April 2018-ին.
  102. «Bosnian Serb politician convicted by UN tribunal to serve jail term in Denmark». UN News. 4 March 2008. Վերցված է 8 May 2018-ին.
  103. «Former high-ranking Bosnian Serbs receive sentences for war crimes from UN tribunal». UN News. 27 March 2013. Վերցված է 17 April 2018-ին.
  104. «UN tribunal sentences former Bosnian Serb president to 11 years». UN News. 27 February 2003. Վերցված է 12 April 2020-ին.
  105. Butcher, Tim (15 December 1999). «'Serb Adolf' killer gets 40 years for war crimes». The Independent.
  106. «UN war crimes tribunal jails Bosnian Serb for 10 years for burning down village». UN News. 30 March 2004. Վերցված է 14 February 2020-ին.
  107. «UN war crimes tribunal convicts five Bosnian Serbs for 'orgy of persecution'». UN News. 2 November 2001. Վերցված է 12 April 2020-ին.
  108. «Three officials in former Yugoslavia sentenced by UN tribunal to 6-17 years». UN News. 17 October 2003. Վերցված է 12 April 2020-ին.
  109. Julian Borger (30 June 2021). «Serbian secret police chiefs sentenced to 12 years over Bosnian war atrocities». Guardian. Վերցված է 1 July 2021-ին.
  110. «UN hails conviction of Mladic, the 'epitome of evil,' a momentous victory for justice». UN News. 22 November 2017. Վերցված է 25 July 2019-ին. «The convictions against the former Bosnian Serb army commander included for commanding violent ethnic cleansing campaigns across Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1992 to 1995»
  111. «Bosnian Croat commander convicted by UN tribunal to serve jail term in Italy». UN News. 25 April 2008. Վերցված է 4 May 2018-ին.
  112. «Appeals Chamber Judgement in the Case the Prosecutor v. Dario Kordic and Mario Cerkez». International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 17 December 2004. Վերցված է 12 April 2020-ին.
  113. Rachel Irwin (30 May 2013). «Guilty Sentences for Six Bosnian Croat Leaders». IWPR. Վերցված է 25 July 2019-ին.
  114. Prosecutor v. Karadžić – Judgement, 24 March 2016, p. 1300
  115. Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez – Judgement, 26 February 2001, p. 216

Կաղապար:Bosnian War



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The town contains a fire station, in addition to the area's part-time Garda station, a health centre, a public library, and a credit union as well as various restaurants, including Romayo's which was voted to be the best Take-Away in Leinster in 2014.[1] Maynooth Community Library hosts regular public events, including book clubs, a film club, children's storytime, and author visits. It also offers services and events relating to National Healthy Ireland and Work Matters initiatives.

The town is the main retail and service centre for North Kildare and South Meath, with several supermarkets as well as a wide variety of non-chain stores.

In October 2005, Dunnes Stores opened a major shopping centre off the town's main street, Manor Mills.[2] This centre contains a number of other high street shops.

Carton House is a five-star hotel located on the outskirts of Maynooth. In 2020, it was announced that the hotel would be managed by the Fairmont hospitality group.[3]

Royal Canal harbour, Maynooth 2023

When the Royal Canal was designed in 1790, with a planned length of 175 km, with 76 locks, 65 aqueducts and 85 bridges, it was intended to pass north of the town of Maynooth. However the Duke of Leinster contributed £1,000 towards the cost of the £200,000 undertaking and insisted that his town would be served by the canal.[4] Maynooth has a canal harbour, and the canal is navigable from central Dublin to this point and onwards to Clondara, County Longford. It is now mostly used mostly for leisure and drainage purposes but historically was used for passengers and freight (grain, potatoes, coal and coke, manure, turf, bricks, stone, sand, timber, and general merchandise) and Maynooth's canal harbour provided a stopping point before Dublin. When the railways arrived, passengers transferred to the quicker rail service.

The harbour, known locally as Duke's Harbour, is roughly triangular in shape and on the north side of the canal, opposite the railway station, is a popular fishing area.

Maynooth railway station is one of the busiest in the Dublin / Kildare region, as it serves two major educational institutions and is a major commuter town for people working in Dublin. The town is the terminus of most Iarnród Éireann Western Commuter trains, as well as being served by the Dublin-Sligo InterCity service.

In December 2019, Iarnród Éireann awarded a contract for Multi-Disciplinary Consultancy Team[5] for the expansion of the Dublin Area Rapid Transit on the Maynooth Line which will lead to electrification of the line to Maynooth and increase capacity on the line.

Dublin Bus operates routes C3, C4 and the night buses C5 and C6, from Maynooth to Ringsend in Dublin.[6] Go-Ahead Ireland operates the W61, which links Maynooth to the Hazelhatch and Celbridge Railway Station.[7] Bus Éireann services 22 (Ballina to Dublin Airport), 23 (Sligo to Dublin Airport) and 115 (Mullingar/Kilcock to Dublin) serve the town, as well as Aircoach's route 706/706X (Galway to Dublin Airport).[8][9][10][11] Passengers may travel from Maynooth westbound or to Dublin Airport. Airport Hopper route 767 provides an additional higher frequency link to Dublin Airport.[12]

JJ Kavanagh/National Transport Authority route 139 links Naas to Blanchardstown via Maynooth. A number of private operators also serve the town, linking it with nearby towns and cities; many in college term-time only.

  1. «Did your favourite takeaway make the list of Ireland's best takeaways? |». JOE. 2014. Արխիվացված օրիգինալից 7 June 2016-ին. Վերցված է 2 December 2016-ին.
  2. Fagan, Jack (12 October 2005). «Growing retail market in Maynooth attracts the big players». The Irish Times. Արխիվացված օրիգինալից 26 September 2021-ին. Վերցված է 21 December 2019-ին.
  3. «Carton House to be rebranded and refurbished in new management deal». The Irish Times (անգլերեն). Վերցված է 2022-11-26-ին.
  4. Ruth Delany, "Ireland's Royal Canal 1789-1992"
  5. Bauress, Henry (20 December 2019). «Irish Rail appoint team to prepare Dart line for Maynooth and Leixlip». Leinster Leader. Արխիվացված օրիգինալից 31 December 2019-ին. Վերցված է 31 December 2019-ին.(subscription required)
  6. «Goodbye No.25 and 66, hello C-Spine. What Dublin's latest BusConnects changes mean for your daily commute». Independent.ie. 22 November 2021. Վերցված է 18 December 2021-ին.
  7. «Phase 5a: W-Orbital». Transport for Ireland (ամերիկյան անգլերեն). February 2024. Վերցված է 1 March 2024-ին.
  8. «Route 706 706X timetable». Aircoach. Վերցված է 18 December 2021-ին.
  9. «Expressway Route 22, Dublin – Ballina». Bus Éireann. Արխիվացված օրիգինալից 18 July 2021-ին. Վերցված է 23 December 2019-ին.
  10. «Expressway Route 23, Dublin – Sligo». Bus Éireann. Արխիվացված օրիգինալից 26 September 2021-ին. Վերցված է 23 December 2019-ին.
  11. «View Timetables – 115». Bus Éireann. Արխիվացված օրիգինալից 14 December 2020-ին. Վերցված է 23 December 2019-ին.
  12. «Maynooth timetable». Airport Hopper. Արխիվացված օրիգինալից 18 October 2019-ին. Վերցված է 23 December 2019-ին.

Կաղապար:County Kildare

  1. 1 2 3 Identifier Yugoslav(s) has been used both as an ethnic or supra-ethnic/national label and as a demonym for citizens and inhabitants of the former Yugoslavia. Following the breakup of Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav Wars, the vast majority of those who once identified themselves as "Yugoslavs" abandoned the label in favor of traditional ethnic ones or national identities of the successor nations. In some instances, especially in multi-ethnic historical entities, some people chose to use sub-national and regional identifications like Istria–Istrians (see Istrian identity), Vojvodina–Vojvođans.[79][80]
  2. The ICTY defined persecution as a discriminatory policy aimed against a particular group by targeting them through "killings, physical and psychological abuse, rape, establishment and perpetuation of inhumane living conditions, forcible transfer or deportation, terrorising and abuse, forced labour at front lines and the use of human shields, plunder of property, wanton destruction of private property, including cultural monuments and sacred sites, and imposition and maintenance of restrictive and discriminatory measures".[98]
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